trevp at trevp.net
Wed May 14 16:40:57 PDT 2014
On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 2:38 PM, Robert Ransom <rransom.8774 at gmail.com> wrote:
> On 5/14/14, Trevor Perrin <trevp at trevp.net> wrote:
>> Anyone know what the best version of MQV is? (HMQV, FHMQV, CMQV, SMQV, TMQV,
> I assume that anything with “MQV” in its name is patented, so I've
> only looked at the original MQV, and only cursorily (just enough to
> verify that ‘Ace’ doesn't look anything like MQV).
> My recommendations would be:
> * If you are willing to implement and use a signature scheme, have the
> server sign a (DH public key, time interval) certificate and send it.
Time sync's another issue there.
> * If you are willing to require that authentication public keys live
> in the same group as the forward-secrecy keypairs, and don't want to
> use signatures, consider ‘Ace’ (a variant of the 1986 ‘MTI/C0’
> protocol described in the original MQV paper). (‘Ace’ can be modified
> to perform mutual authentication by replacing the client's X_1
> ephemeral keypair with a long-term authentication keypair.)
Such a mutual-auth Ace would be similar to NIST SP 800-56B's "full
unified model", right? I.e. it would perform a static-static DH and
an ephemeral-ephemeral DH, then combine them into a session key.
So wouldn't it have a "key-compromise-impersonation" weakness, where
if I compromise your private key, I can impersonate anyone else to you
by calculating the static-static DH?
> * If you don't want to use signatures and you don't want to do
> authentication in the same group as forward secrecy, use a
> straightforward DH authentication protocol (like e.g. ntor or what
> you've called ‘Triple-DH’).
Not sure what you mean, don't things like Ntor and TripleDH require
ephemeral and long-term keys to be on the same curve?
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