[messaging] User key lookup and the Web PKI analogy
diafygi at gmail.com
Tue Aug 19 14:36:32 PDT 2014
I agree that emulating Web PKI might not fit this situation, but
that's because I'm not sure I fully understand the need for any PKI
for human-to-human messaging. I don't need to be able to authenticate
everyone out there, just the people I want to communicate with.
This whole situation seems pretty similar to dealing with phone
numbers. Back before programmable phones, the phone book basically
acted as a the central PKI for numbers, and you would go look up
someone's number if you wanted to call them. However, once we had
programmable phones and started maintaining our own contact lists, we
found that we didn't really need the phone book anymore.
Sure, it's now a bit more inconvenient to not be able to look up
someone's number if you don't already have it, but I guess we
compensate for that now by being sure to get the phone number at first
contact or getting it through a friend of a friend. Either way, phone
number authentication is now much more of a social interaction than it
used to be, which I take to mean that as a society we deem social
authentication as better than centralized authentication.
Another example of no-PKI authentication is SSH. Every time you try to
ssh into a new server, by default, you see the message:
The authenticity of host 'example.com (192.168.1.2)' can't be established.
ECDSA key fingerprint is 12:34:56:78:90:ab:cd:ef:12:34:56:78:90:ab:cd:ef.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)?
You usually accept it because you have context for the situation. Your
boss probably gave you the address, or you got the address from the
list of instances on AWS, or whatever other interaction lead you to
try and connect with that server in the first place. You didn't need
to verify the authenticity with some other party because you have
PKI, for me, serves the purpose of providing authentication without
prior context (hence why it's needed in Web PKI). However, in
human-to-human messaging, there's almost always prior context, so I
don't really see the need to force a standardized PKI.
On Tue, Aug 19, 2014 at 3:27 AM, Trevor Perrin <trevp at trevp.net> wrote:
> One theme in the keyserver discussion is seeking analogies with the
> Web PKI, or trying to adapt ideas from it (like CT). But the Web PKI
> evolved under performance constraints that are very different from
> "user key lookup", so we should be careful.
> In particular, for latency and reliability reasons browsers don't want
> to perform extra lookups during an SSL handshake. So the browser has
> to verify the server's certificate without another source of
> information, which means the certificate has to be endorsed by an
> authority the browser already knows about. This dictates the
> centralized nature of the CA system and CT.
> But user key lookup is a rarer operation than visiting a web page, so
> can take more time. So it might be OK if Alice looks up Bob's key
> however she wants: central directory, Bob's provider, various key
> servers she trusts for different reasons, an aggregator, or some
> There may still be reasons to prefer a centralized system, or to use
> it in conjunction with other options. But I think that needs to be
> justified on better grounds than "it worked for the web", and also
> taking consideration the risks of centralization Moxie's written
> Messaging mailing list
> Messaging at moderncrypto.org
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