<p dir="ltr">My understanding is that the mechanism Apple would have to use to actively MITM an account is the same mechanism as adding a new device to a user's iMessage account. This produces a notification on the user's other devices that effectively notify when an additional public key is registered for the user name. </p>
<p dir="ltr">Obviously this is all proprietary software but as designed, an active MITM of iMessage messages would be visible to the recipient as an unexpected "device added" message. <br>
</p>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Nov 5, 2014 9:01 PM, "Tao Effect" <<a href="mailto:contact@taoeffect.com">contact@taoeffect.com</a>> wrote:<br type="attribution"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style="word-wrap:break-word">Half-answering the first part of my question:<div><br></div><div>It seems that the methodology that was used is not accurately represented by the 2nd column header.</div><div><br></div><div>In other words, this:</div><div><br></div><div><blockquote style="margin:0 0 0 40px;border:none;padding:0px"><div><strong>2.</strong> <strong>Is your communication encrypted with a key the provider doesn't have access to?</strong> <br>This
criterion requires that all user communications are end-to-end
encrypted. This means the keys necessary to decrypt messages must be
generated and stored at the endpoints (i.e. by users, not by servers).
The keys should never leave endpoints except with explicit user action,
such as to backup a key or synchronize keys between two devices. It is
fine if users' public keys are exchanged using a centralized server.</div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Does not equal this:</div><div><br></div></div><blockquote style="margin:0 0 0 40px;border:none;padding:0px"><div><div><b>Encrypted so the provider can’t read it?</b></div></div></blockquote><div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>The provider can read messages if it acts as a MITM, and Apple does act as a MITM. Therefore Apples has the capability to read all iMessages, and does not provide end-to-end encryption.</div><div><br></div><div>The second concern is regarding the plain-text storage of messages (or storage with a key belonging to Apple), which appears to allow Apple to decrypt messages stored by iCloud. This is expanded further by the Ars Technical article linked to in the second twitter link I mentioned previously.</div><div><br></div><div>- Greg</div><div>
<br><span style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:Helvetica;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;line-height:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;display:inline!important;float:none">--</span><br style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:Helvetica;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;line-height:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px"><span style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:Helvetica;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;line-height:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;display:inline!important;float:none">Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also sharing</span><span style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:Helvetica;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;line-height:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;display:inline!important;float:none"> with the NSA.</span>
</div>
<br><div><div>On Nov 5, 2014, at 8:45 PM, Tao Effect <<a href="mailto:contact@taoeffect.com" target="_blank">contact@taoeffect.com</a>> wrote:</div><br><blockquote type="cite"><div style="word-wrap:break-word">I echo nikos questions, especially question #2:<div><br></div><div><blockquote type="cite">2. How is Skype communications "encrypted so the provider can't read"<br>verified? (or even more important how is this compatible with Prism? ;))</blockquote><div><br></div><div>Sorry if I missed it, but I searched and don't believe he received an answer.</div><div><br></div><div>It seems to me this question also applies to Apple's iMessages, which can be read by the provider:</div><div><br></div><div><a href="https://twitter.com/taoeffect/status/529841963378671618" target="_blank">https://twitter.com/taoeffect/status/529841963378671618</a></div><div><br></div><div>Also, I don't believe Apple deserves the checkbox for "Are past comms secure if keys are stolen", since that does not appear to be the case:</div><div><br></div><div><a href="https://twitter.com/taoeffect/status/529852246125981696" target="_blank">https://twitter.com/taoeffect/status/529852246125981696</a></div><div><br></div><div>In summary, could someone please either provide an explanation for why Apple received these two checkbox, or could the EFF please update their table so that that Apple's iMessages is truthfully represented in the table?</div><div><br></div><div>Thank you,</div><div>Greg Slepak</div><div>
<br><span style="font-family:Helvetica;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;line-height:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;float:none;display:inline!important">--</span><br style="font-family:Helvetica;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;line-height:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px"><span style="font-family:Helvetica;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;line-height:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;float:none;display:inline!important">Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also sharing</span><span style="font-family:Helvetica;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;line-height:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;float:none;display:inline!important"> with the NSA.</span>
</div>
<br><div><div>On Nov 4, 2014, at 10:02 AM, Nikos Roussos <<a href="mailto:comzeradd@fsfe.org" target="_blank">comzeradd@fsfe.org</a>> wrote:</div><br><blockquote type="cite">On 11/04/2014 06:43 PM, Joseph Bonneau wrote:<br><blockquote type="cite">First version launched today: <a href="https://www.eff.org/secure-messaging-scorecard" target="_blank">https://www.eff.org/secure-messaging-scorecard</a><br><br>This was a collaboration between tech advisers (primarily Peter<br>Eckersley and myself) and a good team of people with experience in<br>journalism and activism.<br></blockquote><br>This is indeed a great tool. Kudos for work. Some comments:<br><br>1. How is that iMessage, Facebook Chat or Hangouts are *independently*<br>audited if there is no code available?<br><br>2. How is Skype communications "encrypted so the provider can't read"<br>verified? (or even more important how is this compatible with Prism? ;))<br><br>3. There should be a column "Does is it require to provide your phone<br>number?", which should be considered a security drawback (especially for<br>journalists or their sources).<br><br>4. Probably a column for extra points if an app can easily route traffic<br>through Tor (like ChatSecure).<br><br>5. Not 100% sure, but I think that pidgin/libpurple have been audited in<br>the past.<br><br><br>~nikos<br><br><br>_______________________________________________<br>Messaging mailing list<br><a href="mailto:Messaging@moderncrypto.org" target="_blank">Messaging@moderncrypto.org</a><br><a href="https://moderncrypto.org/mailman/listinfo/messaging" target="_blank">https://moderncrypto.org/mailman/listinfo/messaging</a><br></blockquote></div><br></div></div>_______________________________________________<br>Messaging mailing list<br><a href="mailto:Messaging@moderncrypto.org" target="_blank">Messaging@moderncrypto.org</a><br><a href="https://moderncrypto.org/mailman/listinfo/messaging" target="_blank">https://moderncrypto.org/mailman/listinfo/messaging</a><br></blockquote></div><br></div></div><br>_______________________________________________<br>
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