<div dir="ltr"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dining_cryptographers_problem">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dining_cryptographers_problem</a><div><br></div><div>It seems like it's possible for modern anonymous messaging protocols to have formally provable anonymity guarantees by virtue of secure multiparty computation:</div><div><br></div><div><a href="http://dedis.cs.yale.edu/dissent/papers/analysis.pdf">http://dedis.cs.yale.edu/dissent/papers/analysis.pdf</a></div><div><br></div><div>Are other people working on this sort of formal-proof-of-anonymity besides Dissent?<br clear="all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div class="gmail_signature">Tony Arcieri<br></div>
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