[curves] Granger-Moss primes for 32 bit implementations

Mike Hamburg mike at shiftleft.org
Fri Sep 8 21:55:30 PDT 2017

I might possibly have written an ECC implementation that documents: “The following operations are not implemented for NIST P224 because I didn’t want to compute square roots: …”

At least with only 2^24+1, you don’t have to implement Sutherland’s algorithm.  But the cost of Tonelli-Shanks is nontrivial, since it can still take hundreds of multiplications.

Anyway, I’ll be interested to know what performance you get.

> On Sep 8, 2017, at 9:21 PM, Kyle Butt <kyle at iteratee.net> wrote:
>
> TLDR: How much do square roots matter for ECC primes?
>
> I've been working on finding Granger Moss primes where t fits in a 32 bit integer.
> Along the way, I worked out tighter bounds for the min and max values after reduction.
>
> In the paper, they aren't explicit about how much extra room is needed to handle additions for curve operations. For edwards curves, you need to account for a factor of 6. This changes their formula
> ceil(log_2(m / 2)) + 2k + 5 <= 2w
> to:
> ceil(log_2(3 * m) + 2k + 5 <= 2w
>
> for m + 1 = 17 and 19, this requires k < 26.5
>
> Similarly for their reduction algorithm, they work in bits, but I did the math on the actual bounds.
>
> Assuming z_i = 2^63 - 1, after 1 reduction the max value is 2^(63 - l) - 1 + (t - c)
> t - c = (b - 1) * c, the max value carried from z_(i+1), assuming c < b, after 2 reductions the max value is:
> 2^(63 - 2*l) - 1 + c + (t - c).  = 2^(63 - 2*l) + t - 1. The first c occurs because t/b = c.
> The minimum value is easier to calculate. In this case, the worst case carry is 0.
> so the min value is 2^(63 - 2 * l).
>
> Upon multiplying these values are subtracted. If their difference is less than 2^27.5, then we can adjust the formula above to:
>
> ceil(log_2(3 * m) + 2k + 4 <= 2w
>
> This does place a greater constraint on l, but it yields larger primes.
>
> because we know that the result of the product takes 1 less bit.
> This allows us to construct larger primes for m + 1 = 17, 19.
> For m+1 = 19 we can construct a prime with 483 bits, specifically:
> p = phi 18 t, where t = (2^3 - 1) * (2^24); b = 2^24; l = 24
>
> Unfortunately, these primes are not fast square root primes, by construction. It should be clear that p % (2^24) = 1. How much does this matter? S is 24 in this case, so Tonelli Shanks should be reasonably fast. Equality checking is also a little tricky due to the redundancy, but a subtraction single round of modular carries can be done in parallel. Then you can verify that all the limbs are the same value.
>
> I found an edwards curve that satisfies the safecurves criteria, the constant is unusual but rigid:
> It is the least d in absolute value such that x^2 + y^2 = 1 + (d/b)x^2*y^2 has cofactor {4, 8} and so does its twist. The reason for choosing such a d is that coefficient multiplication requires reduction, which means that even for small constants, they must be in the montgomery domain, taking up at least 2 limbs. But for a constant d/b it can be a single limb.
>
> the least such d is: -56904
> for that curve the trace is: 1805876552616329139365429358604192390835234313183868353172046570215054410
>
> I prototyped the code in Haskell, for quick turnaround and so that I have something where I can print the intermediate values as test vectors for other implementations. I can tidy it up and share it if there's interest. It's not written for speed but for verification.
>
> I plan to try and implement a cuda or opencl version, to try and take advantage of the parallel nature of the primes.
>
> Thoughts or suggestions? Would it be worthwhile to write any of this up in a more formal setting?
>
> I think at a minimum borrowing the half bit by computing tighter bounds is pretty cool.
>
> Kyle
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