[messaging] Transparency for E2E encrypted messaging at a centralized service
rist at cs.wisc.edu
Fri Mar 28 05:09:51 PDT 2014
I haven't been following through all the details of this exchange, so
sorry if this was brought up already, but you might want to check out
I think some of the goals are quite aligned with what's under discussion
(which is quite interesting). Cheers,
On 3/28/14, 5:34 AM, Ben Laurie wrote:
> On 28 March 2014 05:42, Trevor Perrin <trevp at trevp.net> wrote:
>> On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 8:24 PM, Joseph Bonneau <jbonneau at gmail.com> wrote:
>>> Here's an idea that arose between Daniel Kahn Gillmor and I (mistakes all my
>>> own). Imagine you're a centralized web service and you want to offer E2E
>>> encrypted messaging between your users.
>>> *The service runs a Certificate Transparency-style log for every certificate
>>> it issues
>> Interesting, let me try refine the proposal (based on Ben's comments),
>> and list some obstacles:
>> How it might work
>> If I understand Ben [1,2], the service could maintain a "Sparse Merkle
>> Tree" which implements an "authenticated dictionary" with these
>> - Given the root hash of the tree, membership of a particular
>> (username, public key) or (username, <none>) pair can be proven by a
>> fairly small "merkle path" of hash values showing the connection
>> between a leaf element and the root.
>> - The tree can be efficiently updated by publishing deltas .
>> So the service would publish the Sparse Merkle Tree, using deltas so
>> changes to the tree could be efficiently processed by 3rd-party
>> "monitors" (imagine the EFF).
>> For Alice to verify Bob's public key...
>> - Alice would retrieve the tree's root hash from a trusted 3rd-party
>> monitor. Alice would query the service for Bob's (username, public
>> key) and a merkle path showing membership in the tree. By checking
>> membership, Alice confirms that the public key has been published.
>> - Bob would register with the 3rd-party monitor to receive
>> notifications when his public key changes.
>> With this, the service can't change Bob's public key without Bob
>> hearing about it!
> Nice, but here's one more piece - you need to avoid the log cheating
> by, say, reinstating Bob's old, compromised key temporarily, which
> would be invisible to anyone except the victim if you use the sparse
> tree alone.
> So, you also need to keep some kind of change timeline - a traditional
> Merkle Tree of the heads of the sparse tree would do just fine for
> this. Alice would then need to also see a proof that the current hash
> was consistent with her previous view of the timeline tree.
> Then flip-flops as described become visible to Bob, too.
>> - This only has value if Alice and Bob are in the tiny fraction of
>> users who will run 3rd-party clients and setup notifications with a
>> monitoring service.
> So build that into the mail clients.
>> - Even if Bob observes the service being malicious, he has no way to
>> prove this - it will just be his word against the service. So the
>> "herd immunity" value of exposing the service's perfidy seems low.
>> (In contrast to Certificate Transparency for HTTPS, which is likely to
>> expose bad/hacked CAs who obviously shouldn't be issuing the revealed
> Hmm. Presumably Bob would be able to show a new key, signed by many of
> his correspondents, that did not correspond to the published key. That
> seems strong than just Bob's word.
> Ideally you'd also want signed revocations of keys, so non-revocation
> could be demonstrated.
>> - You're asking the service to publish large numbers of usernames,
>> which has privacy / business implications.
> I guess it is in the nature of public monitoring that you have to
> publish what you're monitoring. Perhaps the price you pay for not
> having to trust any third parties?
>> - You're asking the service to setup a system designed to detect its
>> "cheating". Maybe services want/need to cheat occasionally, to handle
>> govt requests?
> The way the law works in most countries means that the govt would
> first have to make it illegal to use the log. If that's legal, then
> their requests have to comply with the laws of physics.
>> Or maybe they don't want the "shitstorm of false
>> accusations" this could trigger from crazy users, as Moxie puts it.
> Have you seen even one accusation against the PGP keyservers?
> BTW, I've been on the receiving end of the "shitstorm of false
> accusations" that go with supplying very widely used s/w (i.e. Apache
> httpd and OpenSSL) for many years. Its more a slow and somewhat
> amusing trickle. :-)
> e.g. http://www.links.org/?p=14.
>> - Social-network messaging services currently do antispam and malware
>> scanning to keep users safe, so may not want e2e encryption at all.
> How about we stop using systems that are so stupidly easy to pop (yes,
> I'm looking at you, Windows)?
>> - A sophisticated attacker might go after the monitoring service, and
>> figure out how to suppress / block notifications.
> Better have lots of those, then :-)
>> Anyways, I need to think on this more. There could be real value, but
>> the costs and obstacles seem pretty high.
>> It might be nice if the infrastructure and tools for this existed, so
>> it could be offered to services in a "ready-to-go" form, perhaps some
>> might be tempted to try...
> The open source CT code
> (https://code.google.com/p/certificate-transparency/) is already
> partially "pluggable", and we'll be making it more so over time.
> However ... patches welcome!
> Messaging mailing list
> Messaging at moderncrypto.org
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