[messaging] Zero knowledge proofs of passport
David Leon Gil
coruus at gmail.com
Sun Jul 27 06:03:16 PDT 2014
Two things:
1. This would be extremely useful for most people's communications; they
want privacy, not anonymity to deniability. (This sort of strong
proof-of-identity linked with a key is perfect for, e.g., doctors, lawyers,
and other professionals.)
(I agree with Trevor that Greenwald/Snowden is inapt.)
But. Suppose that Android app is malicious. For the static case, it can, I
assume, impersonate you forever. How does the private secret in
passports thing work?
2. Pond's low-bandwidth is an artificial constraint. It is easy enough to
run Pond sans Tor, with arbitrarily high message rate. (I've played around
with this a little, actually.)
Introductions are easy, while still avoiding spam: Just require a
really expensive non-parallelizable proof-of-work/puzzle (e.g., 4
core-hours). (The Bill Gates proposal.) Scrypt can't do this without vast
amounts of memory, but some of the PHC entrants can.
- David
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