[messaging] Thoughts on keyservers

[Tao Effect]

I've seen several people mention Certificate Transparency (CT). To pick a recent example:

> (1) The web server problem: a present server needs to prove itself to a
> present visitor. Addressed by CT, etc.

Certificate Transparency does not work.
Nor does it perform as advertised. It does not, as it claims, always provide a log of issued certificates and it does not stop MITM attacks:

- http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg00233.html

- http://okturtles.com/#oktvs

It also does nothing to fix the non-functioning certificate revocation problem (which is not a problem with the blockchain).

Kind regards,
Greg

--
Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also sharing with the NSA.

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