[messaging] Google End-to-End plans on using key directories with a CT-like verification protocol

[Ben Laurie]

On 28 August 2014 19:18, Moxie Marlinspike <moxie at thoughtcrime.org> wrote:
>
> On 08/27/2014 12:32 PM, Tony Arcieri wrote:
>> They plan on having email providers run "Key Directories" and using
>> encrypted messages to gossip data about the directories, providing a
>> CT-like system:
>>
>> https://code.google.com/p/end-to-end/wiki/KeyDistribution
>
> I still have some questions about this approach.  My understanding is that:
>
> 1) The monitors themselves can't determine whether Google is being
> "dishonest," beyond one extremely coarse view of whether Google is
> publishing an appropriate data structure.
>
> This is because:
>
> a) Users' keys will be changing constantly under completely normal
> circumstances.
>
> b) From running a service that operates as a sort of "key directory," I
> know that many times they will even be changing in "suspicious" ways,
> ie. from A to B and then back to A again.
>
> This means:
>
> 2) Users are the only ones who have the information to determine whether
> Google is being dishonest.
>
> This is because:
>
> a) Users are the only ones who know what their keys actually are, and
> whether they were supposed to change.
>
> So we're in a situation where the best a "monitor" can do is provide the
> user with a view of their key state over time, which the user can verify
> with their own knowledge of what their key state should be.  Nobody can
> detect an attack but the user themselves, which they depend on a third
> party service in order to be able to do.  Everything is dependent on the
> user.
>
> I think there are three distinct classes of users:
>
> i) Almost everyone. In the world where all GMail customers are using
> E2E, the vast majority of them won't (and shouldn't be expected to) know
> what their key state should be, or what a key even is.  So for those
> users, Google can make whatever key changes they want with impunity, and
> neither the "monitors" nor the users would be the wiser of Google's
> nefarious ways.  This may be OK, particularly if there's no way for
> Google to distinguish between types of users.

I don't think this is correct. These users won't check their keys, but
their software will. They may not know what a key is, or what keys
they have created, but their software does.

> ii) The crypto few. There is a small percentage of users who will know
> what a key is and understand how this works well enough to be able to
> effectively monitor these changes.
>
> iii) Wingnuts.  Larger than the crypto few, but still a vast minority.
> They'll know what a "key" is, but won't *really* understand how this
> works, and will become convinced that Google has MITMd them when their
> key changed under normal circumstances.
>
> I don't see any way to distinguish the "wingnuts" from "the crypto few."
>  If either user steps forward to declare that their key was compromised,
> the only information we have is the log.  However, the user is the only
> one with the information to determine whether the log is correct or not,
> so there's no real "proof" other than the user's word.  Even with all
> the monitoring infrastructure available, there's still no information
> that a 3rd party can use to determine whether a key was maliciously
> inserted or not.
>
> That doesn't really seem to add up to a great situation.  As I see it:
>
> 1) This is a *lot* of work.  Servers have to maintain these directories
> at volumes (hopefully all gmail users) that are already difficult
> enough.  Other organizations will need to be formed with somewhat
> considerable resources in order to effectively keep up with the monitoring.
>
> 2) Users can be successfully MITM'd, and will only learn about it after
> the fact.

The whole idea of "trust but verify" is that you don't get to
misbehave very often, which substantially reduces the risk of attack
by the "trusted by verified" party.

> 3) It creates a potential SPAM problem.
>
> 4) It creates a potential reputation problem for the key directory,
> since "wingnuts" will constantly be announcing that they've been MITM'd
> (complete with "proof" in the form of the log), and there'll be no way
> for us to distinguish them from "the crypto few."

This is surely true regardless of the existence of keyservers? That
is, no matter how you provision keys, wingnuts will be making these
claims. So, this appears to be an argument against all key
provisioning.

Where, BTW, are the wingnuts claiming that they've been MITMed using TextSecure?

> So my question is, how is this better than doing the following:
>
> 1) Transmitting identity keys in-band.
>
> 2) Doing TOFU for keys seen.
>
> 3) Make the client notifying the user when a key changes, if the user
> has a key change notification preference set.
>
> 4) Leaving the key change notification preference off by default.
>
> It seems to me that this has the same security properties as the CT-like
> system, except:

No. How do I verify that you received my key for me, rather than an
attacker's, in your system? i.e. what you propose above + CT is
strictly better than just your proposal.

> a) A *lot* less work, and a lot less complex.  No need for other
> organizations to form.
>
> b) Both "wingnuts" and "the crypto few" are notified immediately of a
> MITM rather than after the fact.  "Almost everyone" remains blissfully
> unaware, but again maybe that's OK if there's no way for the provider to
> know with certainty which category a user is in.
>
> c) It's harder for wingnuts to get confused.
>
> d) No SPAM problem.

I am failing to figure out what SPAM problem you think there is -
could you elaborate?

>
> I'm really interested in hearing why partisans of the CT-style key
> directory think the overhead and other drawbacks are worth doing it over
> the simpler thing?
>
> - moxie
>
> --
> http://www.thoughtcrime.org
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