[messaging] Simple decentralised KeyBase using the blockchain

Joseph Bonneau jbonneau at gmail.com
Wed Dec 17 05:59:54 PST 2014


Hi Ben-

Is what you're describing similar to Onename (https://onename.io/)? They
use Namecoin instead of Bitcoin so that transferring/updating your info is
more straightforward and you can have a human-readable handle, but
otherwise I think they have the same idea of using a blockchain and
collecting verification of your social media accounts.

Joe

On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 9:24 PM, Ben Harris <mail at bharr.is> wrote:
>
> Hi All,
>
> I love the idea of KeyBase, but as I'm still waiting in the invite queue
> I'd also love a de-centralised version. I've just thrown some ideas around
> and would like to see if it holds up to the scrutiny of the group.
>
> The rough idea is to use the 40 socially-responsible bytes in OP_RETURN to
> encode something that allows:
>   - Me to see that my key-information has been published (block chain is
> public, so yay).
>   - Me to see that other people aren't trying to imitate me.
>   - Everyone to see when I have revoked a key.
>   - My contacts to find my key-information.
>
> The simplest KeyBase-esq design is just to publish on your Twitter - "my
> key fingerprint is X". The problem is that Twitter might change that to
> mention fingerprint Y for select users.
>
> So instead we take all our keys (A), our supported social profiles (B) and
> a SHA224 of a 224 bit revocation code (X), concatenate them and hash the
> result with SHA224 (C). Concatenate will probably just mean place in sorted
> JSON.
>
> C is then your 224 bit key ID.
> Next we take all your profiles in B, calculate the SHA224 of the [account
> type] || [account id] (e.g. "twitteruser1") and take the 32 least
> significant bits of each to get D (which has the same number of entries as
> B, but only 32 bits for each).
>
> Now we publish a transaction to bitcoin and encode the following in the
> OP_RETURN. The transaction contains C and D. It fits nicely when there are
> only two entries in D, otherwise we do the following.
>
> For the first two profiles publish
> "PK" 0 C |D| D(0) D(1)
> Where "PK" is the two ascii bytes PK as a magic number. 0 is 0 byte as the
> packet type, |D| is the total number of social profiles, D(x) is the x-th
> social profile.
>
> For subsequent packets in groups of 6, the packet type is 1, C is only the
> first 96-bits of C, and |D| is an incrementing number
> "PK" 1 trunc(C) 0 D(x) ...
> "PK" 1 trunc(C) 1 D(x) ...
>
> Once this is confirmed in the blockchain, we publish C to our limited
> social profiles (Twitter), or ABCX to a full profile (gist/reddit). ABCX
> can also be sent to key directories (like KeyBase) or key-directories can
> just scrape social profiles.
>
> ## Lookup
> To confirm someone's ID you start by finding ABCX on their full social
> profile (or searching their social name on a key directory). Once you have
> ABCX, you check the blockchain for revocation of X, then confirm the
> blockchain has D that matches B. Then look up proofs on all the social
> profiles mentioned in B.
>
> If this all passes you have the keys for the user.
>
> ## Revocation
> To revoke publicly, you post an OP_RETURN message with X and the first 80
> bits of C.
> "PX" trunc(C) X
>
> X can probably be calculated with PBKDF using the hash of AB as the salt.
>
> ## Notes
> The purpose of D is to detect when someone is planning to impersonate you.
> There will probably be collisions in 32-bits but we can only fit so much
> in. I expect keydirectories may have a notification service to email you
> when a matching D appears.
>
> If OP_RETURN is increased to 80bytes we can fit 10 extra D into each
> packet.
>
> Mobile apps may choose to trust a key-directory, if they have a list of
> block headers the key-directory can still prove that the responses to
> queries have been put in the blockchain. Revocation is much weaker here (as
> you can't prove it doesn't exist), but multiple independent key-directories
> logging PX messages should be as good as reasonably practicable.
>
> The economic value in brute-forcing someone's revocation key should be
> close to 0. Users should still pick a good one though.
>
> Putting all of ABCX into the blockchain is do-able (P2SH), but not a
> socially acceptable use of bitcoin resources (and might get plugged with
> P2SH2).
>
> I looked at better ways of encoding D - bloom tables, golomb coding,
> matrix filter. In the end this was the simplest and good enough (I think?).
>
> I'd love some feedback, and I would still rather hear the feedback even if
> it will take too much time/effort to reword it in a nice way (so don't
> delete it just because you think it is too harsh).
>
> Thanks
> -Ben
>
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