[messaging] Panoramix decryption mixnet messaging spec and design documents

grarpamp grarpamp at gmail.com
Sat Nov 25 12:57:41 PST 2017

Dummy / decoy / fill / chaff traffic itself alone seems insufficient.
If a global passive adversary GPA can inject their own
traffic pattern into the net, and recognize it at some other
useful vantage point, such as an exit or "hidden" destination,
or intermediate hop towards a full disclosure... including if the
pattern is being sent to or between you... they can surely
do the same with whatever traffic a user pushes. Wherein
the users fill traffic may not be subject to the same influence
or channel parameters as the users real data traffic.

Parhaps was talked with Briar / others on cryptography list,
what would GPA proof Ethernet wire look like?
The link level point to point p2p encrypted line / channel would
be full 100% of the time, packet size outside attacker control,
with fill traffic yielding for data traffic, with detection if it was ever
not full or crypto failed (obviously includes received traffic suffered
delays or missing packets), and all data traffic received from elsewhere
for transport over such a line must be reclocked for insertion into the line
to clean any timing / size / data perturbations received.
It may be impossible to time or correlate a 100% full clocked bucket line,
or network that uses the same principle.

The more strayed away towards looser more general more unchecked
constraint upon random fill and the traffic channel, and the less network
wide, perhaps the less benefit it is.

The lines may not need to be full, but they seem to must need
to be fully parameterized, cleaned, checked and enforced.

These are only a few lines of thought among many out there.

Is there a subset list of research papers being curated
somewhere that deal specifically with these sorts of traffic
issues (anti-GPA / fill / decoy / whatever)?

> zcash transactions: from client to blockchain.

For a "privacy" coin, it's counter productive that almost
all coins still don't support TLS, bootstrapping and full use
entirely within overlay networks, etc. The first I know of to
begin making those leaps is Zencash...

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