[messaging] TFC - Onion routed messaging with endpoint security

[Lennart Oldenburg]

Thanks for all the recommendations everyone!

On 27/01/2019 10.13, dawuud wrote:
> 
> The recently published anonymity trilemma paper is fascinating, and
> points out the tradeoff between bandwidth, latency and anonymity; note
> the very interesting graph at the top of page 16, and that Loopix
> holds an interesting position on this graph:
> 
> Anonymity Trilemma: Strong Anonymity, Low
> Bandwidth Overhead, Low Latency—Choose Two
> by Debajyoti Das, Sebastian Meiser, Esfandiar Mohammadi, Aniket Kate
> https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/954.pdf
> 
> 
> The recent Loopix paper explores this tradeoff in the context of a
> continuous time mix strategy called the Poisson mix:
> 
> The Loopix Anonymity System
> by Ania M. Piotrowska, Jamie Hayes, Tariq Elahi, Sebastian Meiser, George Danezis
> https://www.esat.kuleuven.be/cosic/publications/article-2830.pdf
> 
> No need to cry about bandwidth usage if we are willing to sacrifice
> the low latency and replace it with "medium latency". Instead of using
> constant time padding or decoy traffic we can instead make use of a Poisson
> process which samples from an exponential distribution. Loopix clients use a
> FIFO queue for sending messages where items are removed from the queue and sent
> based on time intervals from the Poisson process. If queue is empty send decoys.
> 
> Unsure how well this will work on phones... (especially dubious if they go to sleep)
> Hopefully in the coming years we will see more research into these tradeoffs
> and concrete tuning parameters for Loopix and other similar designs. :)
> 
> Like Holger Krekel said, perhaps mixnets can help. This is our long term plan.
> For short term solutions of course use Tor! (Tor is very obviously the best currently deployed anonymous communication protocol)
> 
> ♥λⒶ 😼 enjoy the reads
> 
> Cheers,
> David
> 
> 
> On Sun, Jan 27, 2019 at 02:05:32AM -0500, grarpamp wrote:
>> DeepCorr: Strong Flow Correlation Attacks on Tor Using Deep Learning
>> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1808.07285
>>
>> Some assert that the only way to beat this
>> class (general timing and traffic analysis) is
>> with full time regulated fill traffic.
>> Then people cry bandwidth... before realizing the
>> selectability of the committed rate is pursuant
>> to their needs, and being no more than they can
>> get, or would use, over non-fill nets anyways.
>> Or with a, unusable for low latency..., random store
>> forward lossy additive mixes... being a non general
>> and gappy form of fill anyway.
>>
>> Are there any papers covering potential schemes for
>> managing traffic fill (negotiation of rates, dynamic
>> yielding to take on wheat presented, hop by hop
>> vs network wide awareness and control mechanisms,
>> dropping nodes that fail to fill per negotiation, etc)?
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