[noise] Regarding Static Key Authentication
Marian Beermann
public at enkore.de
Tue May 1 05:50:46 PDT 2018
Hi Nadim,
yes, if the intention is to have an AKE (authenticated key exchange),
then the peer's static key needs to be authenticated in one way or
another. Noise does not provide an out-of-the-box way to do that.
-Marian
On 01.05.2018 14:31, Nadim Kobeissi wrote:
> Dear David,
> So, the conclusion is that any `s` appearing in either a pre-message or
> message pattern, is assumed to be authenticated out-of-band, as in
> independently of the Noise handshake, by the recipient party?
>
> Thank you,
>
> Nadim Kobeissi
> Symbolic Software • https://symbolic.software
> Sent from office
>
>
> On Tue, May 1, 2018 at 2:10 PM David Wong <davidwong.crypto at gmail.com
> <mailto:davidwong.crypto at gmail.com>> wrote:
>
> > If a token 's' appears in a Noise handshake pattern pre-message
> flight, it
> > is reasonable for us to assume that this key represented by 's' was
> > pre-authenticated by the parties. That is, if the initiator sent
> 's' in a
> > pre-message, then the responder is assumed to have authenticated
> 's' already
> > out of band, using for example a QR code as is the current
> use-case, for
> > example, in the Signal secure messenger.
>
> I don't think this is a good comparison. Signal allows you to
> post-handshake authenticate the session whereas a pre-message `s`
> means that you have pinned `s` and thus you trust the session from the
> start.
>
> `s` in a message pattern implies that you have a way to ensure that
> you know that `s`. This can be done in different ways:
>
> * out of band post-handshake (like Signal)
> * by having the sender also send a signature from some authority that
> you trust (PKI)
> * by recognizing the cert from a trust store
> * ...?
>
> Hope that helps,
> David
>
>
>
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