[noise] Security Assumptions for Noise Pre-Messages
Andris
4FWkKLqzVVJWx6E at protonmail.com
Mon Jul 23 11:55:34 PDT 2018
Hi Trevor
> So they don't really have security properties in the same way as the
> other messages. How they were distributed might have security
> properties
Right. I guess my question might have been unclear. What I wanted to know was what kind of properties Noise requires from this distribution method, whatever it may be.
> I think of the pre-messages as an assumption about the authentic
> knowledge [...]
This sounds to me as if there is some form of authenticity assumption there. Although I might be misunderstanding it.
However,
> [...] (maybe they were sent in clear, maybe encrypted, etc), but from the
> perspective of the protocol that's using the pre-message keys we can't
> say anything about how that was done.
seems to indicate, that this is not the case. At a second glance, this also seems to suffice and therefore be the safest approach.
Andris
Sent with ProtonMail Secure Email.
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
On July 20, 2018 5:24 AM, Trevor Perrin <trevp at trevp.net> wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 13, 2018 at 2:13 PM, Andris 4FWkKLqzVVJWx6E at protonmail.com wrote:
>
> > Hi all,
> >
> > I have been struggling with this for a while now and haven't been able to
> >
> > come up with an entirely satisfying answer. Also, it would be useful to have
> >
> > a more official guidance.
> >
> > My question is: What security properties can be assumed to hold for keys in
> >
> > pre-messages?
>
> Hi Andris,
>
> I think of the pre-messages as an assumption about the authentic
>
> knowledge that exists before the protocol starts. So they don't
>
> really have security properties in the same way as the other messages.
>
> How they were distributed might have security properties (maybe they
>
> were sent in clear, maybe encrypted, etc), but from the perspective of
>
> the protocol that's using the pre-message keys we can't say anything
>
> about how that was done.
>
> Now sure how satisfying an answer this is?
>
> Trevor
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