[messaging] Value of deniability

Eleanor Saitta ella at dymaxion.org
Thu Dec 11 10:51:14 PST 2014

Hash: SHA256

On 2014.12.11 13.39, David R. Andersen wrote:
> I don't believe an undeniable transcript can generally be
> confidential. There will always be a copy laying around somewhere
> that can be leaked, voluntarily or otherwise. Further, even the
> threat of leak will change the dynamic of some negotiations.

I could continue to debate this, but frankly, I'm done.  I understand
that you don't believe this.  Your belief is not borne out by the way
the world actually works.

If the cryptographic community intends on continuing to ignore user
experience, usability, and real world requirements, it will continue
producing useless tools only used by hobbyists, and actual high-risk
users will continue dying unserved.  It's really your call whether you
intend to continue masturbating about theoretical properties, or doing
the hard work of understanding what users actually need.

Apologies for the somewhat harsh tone of this message, but this right
here, right now, is the precise problem that has rendered most
cryptographic tools developed by this community completely irrelevant
for normal users for the past 23 years.


- -- 
Ideas are my favorite toys.


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