[messaging] what is the role of wrap-resistance in onion routing?

[Jeff Burdges]

I haen't quite understood the wrap-resistance property for onion
routing protocols defined in [1], although I first noticed in section 4
of the Sphinx paper [2].  

In short, they do not want attackers to be able to take valid onion
packets, add a layer to the onion, and test it against a router.  

I can imagine this becomes necessary to prove security in the UC
framework, well that's what the paper argues, although I'll need to go
through it more careful to understand the argument.  

As a first point though, I'm not familiar with any actual attacks that
exploit of failure of this property however, not without something else
failing anyways.  

Is there something simple I'm missing here?  

Thanks,
Jeff


[1]  http://cs.brown.edu/~anna/papers/cl05.pdf 
[2]  http://freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/DBLP:conf/sp/DanezisG09.pdf





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