2015 Archives by subject

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Starting: Thu Jan 1 11:34:08 PST 2015
Ending: Tue Dec 22 23:31:41 PST 2015
Messages: 754

• [messaging] "Appear offline" mode for Ricochet   George Kadianakis
• [messaging] "Appear offline" mode for Ricochet   Sarah Jamie Lewis
• [messaging] "Appear offline" mode for Ricochet   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] (no subject)   steve at actor.im
• [messaging] [FORGED] Fwd: alternative to OpenPGP?   Peter Gutmann
• [messaging] Addition in place of concatenation in TripleDH   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Addition in place of concatenation in TripleDH   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Addition in place of concatenation in TripleDH   Michael Hamburg
• [messaging] Addition in place of concatenation in TripleDH   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Advertising public key in email (was: TOFU to ease PGP key discovery)   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Advertising public key in email (was: TOFU to ease PGP key discovery)   Mike Hearn
• [messaging] Advertising public key in email (was: TOFU to ease PGP key discovery)   Tom Ritter
• [messaging] Advertising public key in email (was: TOFU to ease PGP key discovery)   Mike Hearn
• [messaging] Advertising public key in email (was: TOFU to ease PGP key discovery)   Tom Ritter
• [messaging] Advertising public key in email (was: TOFU to ease PGP key discovery)   elijah
• [messaging] Advertising public key in email (was: TOFU to ease PGP key discovery)   Daniel Kahn Gillmor
• [messaging] Advertising public key in email (was: TOFU to ease PGP key discovery)   Mike Hearn
• [messaging] Advertising public key in email (was: TOFU to ease PGP key discovery)   David Gil
• [messaging] Advertising public key in email (was: TOFU to ease PGP key discovery)   Daniel Kahn Gillmor
• [messaging] Advertising public key in email (was: TOFU to ease PGP key discovery)   Andy Isaacson
• [messaging] Advertising public key in email (was: TOFU to ease PGP key discovery)   Daniel Kahn Gillmor
• [messaging] Advertising public key in email (was: TOFU to ease PGP key discovery)   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Advertising public key in email (was: TOFU to ease PGP key discovery)   David Leon Gil
• [messaging] Advertising public key in email (was: TOFU to ease PGP key discovery)   Peter Gutmann
• [messaging] Affirmations   Vincent Breitmoser
• [messaging] Affirmations   Mike Hearn
• [messaging] Affirmations   Vincent Breitmoser
• [messaging] Affirmations   Mike Hearn
• [messaging] Affirmations   Vincent Breitmoser
• [messaging] Affirmations   Daniel Kahn Gillmor
• [messaging] Affirmations   Sam Lanning
• [messaging] Affirmations   nymble
• [messaging] Affirmations // User attribute packets and resource location format   Vincent Breitmoser
• [messaging] Affirmations // User attribute packets and resource location format   Natanael
• [messaging] Affirmations // User attribute packets and resource location format   Vincent Breitmoser
• [messaging] alternative to OpenPGP?   Mansour Moufid
• [messaging] alternative to OpenPGP?   Daniel Kahn Gillmor
• [messaging] alternative to OpenPGP?   Alfonso De Gregorio
• [messaging] alternative to OpenPGP?   Alfonso De Gregorio
• [messaging] alternative to OpenPGP?   carlo von lynX
• [messaging] alternative to OpenPGP?   Simon Josefsson
• [messaging] alternative to OpenPGP?   Peter Gutmann
• [messaging] alternative to OpenPGP?   Simon Josefsson
• [messaging] alternative to OpenPGP?   Peter Gutmann
• [messaging] alternative to OpenPGP?   Mansour Moufid
• [messaging] alternative to OpenPGP?   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] alternative to OpenPGP?   Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] alternative to OpenPGP?   Peter Gutmann
• [messaging] alternative to OpenPGP?   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] alternative to OpenPGP?   Peter Gutmann
• [messaging] alternative to OpenPGP?   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] alternative to OpenPGP?   Van Gegel
• [messaging] alternative to OpenPGP?   GDR!
• [messaging] An argument against DC-nets and for mixnets   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Another Take At Public Key Distribution   Andres Erbsen
• [messaging] Another Take At Public Key Distribution   Tao Effect
• [messaging] Another Take At Public Key Distribution   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Another Take At Public Key Distribution   Andres Erbsen
• [messaging] Another Take At Public Key Distribution   Andres Erbsen
• [messaging] Another Take At Public Key Distribution   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Another Take At Public Key Distribution   Joseph Bonneau
• [messaging] Are vanity onion domains a good idea?   Philipp Winter
• [messaging] Are vanity onion domains a good idea?   Natanael
• [messaging] Are vanity onion domains a good idea?   Mike Hearn
• [messaging] Are vanity onion domains a good idea?   micah
• [messaging] Are vanity onion domains a good idea?   Taylor R Campbell
• [messaging] Are vanity onion domains a good idea?   micah
• [messaging] Are vanity onion domains a good idea?   Mike Hearn
• [messaging] Are vanity onion domains a good idea?   Mike Hearn
• [messaging] Are vanity onion domains a good idea?   Taylor R Campbell
• [messaging] Are vanity onion domains a good idea?   micah
• [messaging] Are vanity onion domains a good idea?   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Axolotl over XMPP   zaki at manian.org
• [messaging] Axolotl over XMPP   Nathan of Guardian
• [messaging] Benchmarking client side cryptography   franta polach
• [messaging] Benchmarking client side cryptography   Daniel Roesler
• [messaging] Benchmarking client side cryptography   David Leon Gil
• [messaging] Can a pre-shared public key prevent MITM-attacks?   U.Mutlu
• [messaging] Can a pre-shared public key prevent MITM-attacks?   U.Mutlu
• [messaging] Can a pre-shared public key prevent MITM-attacks?   Natanael
• [messaging] Can a pre-shared public key prevent MITM-attacks?   U.Mutlu
• [messaging] Can a pre-shared public key prevent MITM-attacks?   Justin King-Lacroix
• [messaging] Can a pre-shared public key prevent MITM-attacks?   U.Mutlu
• [messaging] Can a pre-shared public key prevent MITM-attacks?   Justin King-Lacroix
• [messaging] Can a pre-shared public key prevent MITM-attacks?   Sam Lanning
• [messaging] Can a pre-shared public key prevent MITM-attacks?   Justin King-Lacroix
• [messaging] Can a pre-shared public key prevent MITM-attacks?   Sam Lanning
• [messaging] Can a pre-shared public key prevent MITM-attacks?   Justin King-Lacroix
• [messaging] Can a pre-shared public key prevent MITM-attacks?   U.Mutlu
• [messaging] Can a pre-shared public key prevent MITM-attacks?   Justin King-Lacroix
• [messaging] Can a pre-shared public key prevent MITM-attacks?   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Can a pre-shared public key prevent MITM-attacks?   U.Mutlu
• [messaging] Can a pre-shared public key prevent MITM-attacks?   U.Mutlu
• [messaging] Can a pre-shared public key prevent MITM-attacks?   U.Mutlu
• [messaging] Can a pre-shared public key prevent MITM-attacks?   Tao Effect
• [messaging] Can a pre-shared public key prevent MITM-attacks?   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Can a pre-shared public key prevent MITM-attacks?   U.Mutlu
• [messaging] Chaos Communication Camp 2015   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] collaborative random number generation   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] collaborative random number generation   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] collaborative random number generation   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] collaborative random number generation   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] collaborative random number generation   str4d
• [messaging] collaborative random number generation   Joseph Bonneau
• [messaging] collaborative random number generation   Natanael
• [messaging] collaborative random number generation   Michael Rogers
• [messaging] collaborative random number generation   Michael Rogers
• [messaging] collaborative random number generation   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] collaborative random number generation   carlo von lynX
• [messaging] Confidant Mail, a new cryptographic mail system   Mike Ingle
• [messaging] Confidant Mail, a new cryptographic mail system   Mike Hearn
• [messaging] Confidant Mail, a new cryptographic mail system   J.B. Nicholson-Owens
• [messaging] Confidant Mail, a new cryptographic mail system   Mike Ingle
• [messaging] Confidant Mail binaries for TAILS and MacOS   Mike Ingle
• [messaging] Confidant Mail Linux binaries are up   Mike Ingle
• [messaging] Confidant Mail Linux binaries are up   Steve Weis
• [messaging] Decentralized Pynchon Gate   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Decentralized Pynchon Gate   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Deniable authenticated group messaging   Michael Rogers
• [messaging] Deniable authenticated group messaging   Natanael
• [messaging] Deniable authenticated group messaging   Ben Laurie
• [messaging] Deniable authenticated group messaging   Ben Laurie
• [messaging] Deniable authenticated group messaging   Ximin Luo
• [messaging] Deniable authenticated group messaging   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Deniable authenticated group messaging   Michael Rogers
• [messaging] Deniable authenticated group messaging   Michael Rogers
• [messaging] Deniable authenticated group messaging   Ben Laurie
• [messaging] Deniable authenticated group messaging   Michael Rogers
• [messaging] Deniable authenticated group messaging   Michael Rogers
• [messaging] Deniable authenticated group messaging   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Deniable authenticated group messaging   Ximin Luo
• [messaging] Deniable authenticated group messaging   Ben Laurie
• [messaging] Deniable authenticated group messaging   Berkant Ustaoglu
• [messaging] Deniable authenticated group messaging   Ximin Luo
• [messaging] Deniable authenticated group messaging   Peter Gutmann
• [messaging] Deniable authenticated group messaging   Michael Rogers
• [messaging] Deniable authenticated group messaging   Michael Rogers
• [messaging] Deniable authenticated group messaging   Michael Rogers
• [messaging] Deniable authenticated group messaging   Michael Rogers
• [messaging] Deniable authenticated group messaging   Michael Rogers
• [messaging] Deniable authenticated group messaging   Natanael
• [messaging] Deniable authenticated group messaging   Michael Rogers
• [messaging] Deterministic nonce generation for AES-CTR   Nick Badger
• [messaging] Deterministic nonce generation for AES-CTR   Joseph Bonneau
• [messaging] Deterministic nonce generation for AES-CTR   Taylor R Campbell
• [messaging] Deterministic nonce generation for AES-CTR   Nick Badger
• [messaging] Deterministic nonce generation for AES-CTR   Paul Lambert
• [messaging] Deterministic nonce generation for AES-CTR   Joseph Bonneau
• [messaging] Deterministic nonce generation for AES-CTR   Taylor R Campbell
• [messaging] Deterministic nonce generation for AES-CTR   Nick Badger
• [messaging] distributed social graph, was: collaborative random number generation   carlo von lynX
• [messaging] distributed social graph, was: collaborative random number generation   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] distributed social graph, was: collaborative random number generation   Karl
• [messaging] distributed social graph, was: collaborative random number generation   carlo von lynX
• [messaging] Distributed vs cloud vs federation   carlo von lynX
• [messaging] DNSChain 0.5 is now usable for apps   Tao Effect
• [messaging] Do Blockchains solve Zooko's triangle? (was: Another Take At Public Key Distribution)   Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] Do Blockchains solve Zooko's triangle? (was: Another Take At Public Key Distribution)   Tao Effect
• [messaging] Do Blockchains solve Zooko's triangle? (was: Another Take At Public Key Distribution)   Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] Do Blockchains solve Zooko's triangle? (was: Another Take At Public Key Distribution)   Tao Effect
• [messaging] Do Blockchains solve Zooko's triangle? (was: Another Take At Public Key Distribution)   Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] Do Blockchains solve Zooko's triangle? (was: Another Take At Public Key Distribution)   Tao Effect
• [messaging] Do Blockchains solve Zooko's triangle? (was: Another Take At Public Key Distribution)   Jonathan Rudenberg
• [messaging] Do Blockchains solve Zooko's triangle? (was: Another Take At Public Key Distribution)   Tao Effect
• [messaging] Do Blockchains solve Zooko's triangle? (was: Another Take At Public Key Distribution)   Karl
• [messaging] Do Blockchains solve Zooko's triangle? (was: Another Take At Public Key Distribution)   Tao Effect
• [messaging] Do Blockchains solve Zooko's triangle? (was: Another Take At Public Key Distribution)   Jae Kwon
• [messaging] Do Blockchains solve Zooko's triangle? (was: Another Take At Public Key Distribution)   Tao Effect
• [messaging] Do Blockchains solve Zooko's triangle? (was: Another Take At Public Key Distribution)   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [messaging] Do Blockchains solve Zooko's triangle? (was: Another Take At Public Key Distribution)   Jae Kwon
• [messaging] Do Blockchains solve Zooko's triangle? (was: Another Take At Public Key Distribution)   Ben Harris
• [messaging] Do Blockchains solve Zooko's triangle? (was: Another Take At Public Key Distribution)   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [messaging] Do Blockchains solve Zooko's triangle? (was: Another Take At Public Key Distribution)   Ben Harris
• [messaging] Do quantum attacks/algos also lead to compromise of PFS?   Tao Effect
• [messaging] Do quantum attacks/algos also lead to compromise of PFS?   Taylor R Campbell
• [messaging] Do quantum attacks/algos also lead to compromise of PFS?   Tao Effect
• [messaging] Do quantum attacks/algos also lead to compromise of PFS?   Tao Effect
• [messaging] Do quantum attacks/algos also lead to compromise of PFS?   str4d
• [messaging] Do quantum attacks/algos also lead to compromise of PFS?   Joseph Bonneau
• [messaging] Do quantum attacks/algos also lead to compromise of PFS?   Morten Linderud
• [messaging] Do quantum attacks/algos also lead to compromise of PFS?   D. J. Bernstein
• [messaging] Do quantum attacks/algos also lead to compromise of PFS?   Tao Effect
• [messaging] Do quantum attacks/algos also lead to compromise of PFS?   U.Mutlu
• [messaging] Do quantum attacks/algos also lead to compromise of PFS?   Adam Langley
• [messaging] Do quantum attacks/algos also lead to compromise of PFS?   Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] Do quantum attacks/algos also lead to compromise of PFS?   Tao Effect
• [messaging] Do quantum attacks/algos also lead to compromise of PFS?   Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] Do quantum attacks/algos also lead to compromise of PFS?   Tao Effect
• [messaging] Do quantum attacks/algos also lead to compromise of PFS?   Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] Do quantum attacks/algos also lead to compromise of PFS?   Watson Ladd
• [messaging] Do quantum attacks/algos also lead to compromise of PFS?   Tao Effect
• [messaging] Do quantum attacks/algos also lead to compromise of PFS?   Mike Hamburg
• [messaging] Do quantum attacks/algos also lead to compromise of PFS?   Tao Effect
• [messaging] Do quantum attacks/algos also lead to compromise of PFS?   Mike Hamburg
• [messaging] Do quantum attacks/algos also lead to compromise of PFS?   Tao Effect
• [messaging] Do quantum attacks/algos also lead to compromise of PFS?   Hanno Böck
• [messaging] Do quantum attacks/algos also lead to compromise of PFS?   Michael Rogers
• [messaging] Do quantum attacks/algos also lead to compromise of PFS?   Watson Ladd
• [messaging] Do quantum attacks/algos also lead to compromise of PFS?   Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] Do quantum attacks/algos also lead to compromise of PFS?   William Whyte
• [messaging] Do quantum attacks/algos also lead to compromise of PFS?   Taylor R Campbell
• [messaging] Encrypted Groups with Pre-shared keys   steve at actor.im
• [messaging] Encrypted Pulic Contact Discovery   steve at actor.im
• [messaging] Encrypted Pulic Contact Discovery   Matthew Hodgson
• [messaging] Encrypted Pulic Contact Discovery   Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] Encrypted Pulic Contact Discovery   Moxie Marlinspike
• [messaging] Encrypted Pulic Contact Discovery   steve at actor.im
• [messaging] Encrypted Pulic Contact Discovery   steve at actor.im
• [messaging] Encrypted Pulic Contact Discovery   Matthew Hodgson
• [messaging] Encrypted Pulic Contact Discovery   Daniel Reichert
• [messaging] Encrypted Pulic Contact Discovery   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Encrypted Pulic Contact Discovery   Ian Goldberg
• [messaging] Encrypted Pulic Contact Discovery   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Encrypted Pulic Contact Discovery   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Encrypted Pulic Contact Discovery   Daniel Reichert
• [messaging] Encrypted Pulic Contact Discovery   Mike Hearn
• [messaging] Encrypted Pulic Contact Discovery   Steve Weis
• [messaging] Encrypted Pulic Contact Discovery   Mike Hearn
• [messaging] Encrypted Pulic Contact Discovery   steve at actor.im
• [messaging] Encrypted Pulic Contact Discovery   Ben Laurie
• [messaging] Encrypted Pulic Contact Discovery   Justin King-Lacroix
• [messaging] Encrypted Pulic Contact Discovery   Mike Hearn
• [messaging] Encrypted Pulic Contact Discovery   Justin King-Lacroix
• [messaging] Encrypted Pulic Contact Discovery   Mike Hearn
• [messaging] Encrypted Pulic Contact Discovery   Justin King-Lacroix
• [messaging] Encrypted Pulic Contact Discovery   Steve Weis
• [messaging] Encrypted Pulic Contact Discovery   Justin King-Lacroix
• [messaging] Encrypted Pulic Contact Discovery   Steve Weis
• [messaging] Encrypted Pulic Contact Discovery   steve at actor.im
• [messaging] Encrypted Pulic Contact Discovery   Steve Weis
• [messaging] Encrypted Pulic Contact Discovery   Ben Laurie
• [messaging] Encrypted Pulic Contact Discovery   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Encrypted Pulic Contact Discovery   Ben Laurie
• [messaging] Encrypted Pulic Contact Discovery   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Exposing MITM attacks socially engineered through group chat introductions   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Exposing MITM attacks socially engineered through group chat introductions   carlo von lynX
• [messaging] Exposing MITM attacks socially engineered through group chat introductions   carlo von lynX
• [messaging] Exposing MITM attacks socially engineered through group chat introductions   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Exposing MITM attacks socially engineered through group chat introductions   carlo von lynX
• [messaging] Facebook will now PGP encrypt notification messages if you want it to   Mike Hearn
• [messaging] Facebook will now PGP encrypt notification messages if you want it to   Dominik Schuermann
• [messaging] Facebook will now PGP encrypt notification messages if you want it to   Michael Toren
• [messaging] Facebook will now PGP encrypt notification messages if you want it to   Mike Hearn
• [messaging] Facebook will now PGP encrypt notification messages if you want it to   Daniel Roesler
• [messaging] Facebook will now PGP encrypt notification messages if you want it to   Dominik Schuermann
• [messaging] Facebook will now PGP encrypt notification messages if you want it to   Steve Weis
• [messaging] Facebook will now PGP encrypt notification messages if you want it to   Daniel Roesler
• [messaging] Forward secrecy in the EFF messaging scorecard   Ximin Luo
• [messaging] Forward secrecy in the EFF messaging scorecard   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Forward secrecy in the EFF messaging scorecard   Joseph Bonneau
• [messaging] Fwd: [Cfrg] Analysis of Hash-Based Signatures (draft-mcgrew-hash-sigs-02)   David Leon Gil
• [messaging] Fwd: alternative to OpenPGP?   Mansour Moufid
• [messaging] Fwd: alternative to OpenPGP?   Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] Fwd: TOFU to ease PGP key discovery   Tankred Hase
• [messaging] Fwd: TOFU to ease PGP key discovery   Tankred Hase
• [messaging] Giving new devices access to old messages   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Giving new devices access to old messages   Matthew Hodgson
• [messaging] Giving new devices access to old messages   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Giving new devices access to old messages   Gary Belvin
• [messaging] Giving new devices access to old messages   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Giving new devices access to old messages   Nadim Kobeissi
• [messaging] Giving new devices access to old messages   David Leon Gil
• [messaging] Giving new devices access to old messages   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Giving new devices access to old messages   Michael Rogers
• [messaging] Group consistency with removal (was: Matrix.org)   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Group consistency with removal (was: Matrix.org)   Jonathan Moore
• [messaging] Group consistency with removal (was: Matrix.org)   Jonathan Moore
• [messaging] Group consistency with removal (was: Matrix.org)   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] HChaCha [was Secure OpenPGP Key Pair Synchronization]   David Leon Gil
• [messaging] Hold the Axolotl ratchet   Sebastian Verschoor
• [messaging] Hold the Axolotl ratchet   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Hold the Axolotl ratchet   Ximin Luo
• [messaging] How secure is TextSecure?   Nadim Kobeissi
• [messaging] How secure is TextSecure?   Nadim Kobeissi
• [messaging] How secure is TextSecure?   Nadim Kobeissi
• [messaging] How secure is TextSecure?   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] How secure is TextSecure?   Nadim Kobeissi
• [messaging] Identity keys and fingerprints   David Leon Gil
• [messaging] Identity keys and fingerprints   zaki at manian.org
• [messaging] Identity keys and fingerprints   David Leon Gil
• [messaging] Identity keys and fingerprints   Sam Lanning
• [messaging] Identity keys and fingerprints   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Key comparison [TextSecure]   N A
• [messaging] Key comparison [TextSecure]   Linus Lotz
• [messaging] Key comparison [TextSecure]   Linus Lotz
• [messaging] Key comparison [TextSecure]   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Key comparison [TextSecure]   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Key comparison [TextSecure] (Jeff Burdges)   Katriel Cohn-Gordon
• [messaging] Key comparison [TextSecure] (Jeff Burdges)   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Key exchange and DuplexWrap-like protocols   Michael Hamburg
• [messaging] Key exchange and DuplexWrap-like protocols   Ben Harris
• [messaging] Key exchange and DuplexWrap-like protocols   Mike Hamburg
• [messaging] Key exchange and DuplexWrap-like protocols   Ben Harris
• [messaging] Key exchange and DuplexWrap-like protocols   Mike Hamburg
• [messaging] Key rotation   David Leon Gil
• [messaging] Key rotation   carlo von lynX
• [messaging] Key rotation   Andy Isaacson
• [messaging] Key rotation   carlo von lynX
• [messaging] Key rotation   Michael Rogers
• [messaging] Key rotation   carlo von lynX
• [messaging] Key rotation   Michael Rogers
• [messaging] Key rotation   Michael Rogers
• [messaging] Key rotation   carlo von lynX
• [messaging] libforwardsec: forward secure encryption for email and asynchronous messaging   Ian Miers
• [messaging] libforwardsec: forward secure encryption for email and asynchronous messaging   Tao Effect
• [messaging] libforwardsec: forward secure encryption for email and asynchronous messaging   Ximin Luo
• [messaging] libforwardsec: forward secure encryption for email and asynchronous messaging   Ben Harris
• [messaging] libforwardsec: forward secure encryption for email and asynchronous messaging   Ximin Luo
• [messaging] libforwardsec: forward secure encryption for email and asynchronous messaging   carlo von lynX
• [messaging] libforwardsec: forward secure encryption for email and asynchronous messaging   Ximin Luo
• [messaging] libforwardsec: forward secure encryption for email and asynchronous messaging   Ian Miers
• [messaging] libforwardsec: forward secure encryption for email and asynchronous messaging   Ian Goldberg
• [messaging] libforwardsec: forward secure encryption for email and asynchronous messaging   Ian Miers
• [messaging] libforwardsec: forward secure encryption for email and asynchronous messaging   Ximin Luo
• [messaging] libforwardsec: forward secure encryption for email and asynchronous messaging   Ximin Luo
• [messaging] libforwardsec: forward secure encryption for email and asynchronous messaging   Van Gegel
• [messaging] libforwardsec: forward secure encryption for email and asynchronous messaging   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] libforwardsec: forward secure encryption for email and asynchronous messaging   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Linked Identities (was: affirmations)   Vincent Breitmoser
• [messaging] Linked Identities (was: affirmations)   Daniel Kahn Gillmor
• [messaging] Linked Identities (was: affirmations)   Vincent Breitmoser
• [messaging] Linked Identities (was: affirmations)   Vincent Breitmoser
• [messaging] Linked Identities (was: affirmations)   Daniel Kahn Gillmor
• [messaging] Linked Identities (was: affirmations)   Daniel Kahn Gillmor
• [messaging] Linked Identities (was: affirmations)   carmen r
• [messaging] Matrix.. is Federation at odds with Privacy?   carlo von lynX
• [messaging] Matrix.. is Federation at odds with Privacy?   steve at actor.im
• [messaging] Matrix.. is Federation at odds with Privacy?   Matthew Hodgson
• [messaging] Matrix.. is Federation at odds with Privacy?   carlo von lynX
• [messaging] Matrix.. is Federation at odds with Privacy?   carlo von lynX
• [messaging] Matrix.. is Federation at odds with Privacy?   Daniel Kahn Gillmor
• [messaging] Matrix.. is Federation at odds with Privacy?   Matthew Hodgson
• [messaging] Matrix.. is Federation at odds with Privacy?   carlo von lynX
• [messaging] Matrix.. is Federation at odds with Privacy?   Matthew Hodgson
• [messaging] Matrix.. is Federation at odds with Privacy?   carlo von lynX
• [messaging] Matrix.. is Federation at odds with Privacy?   Matthew Hodgson
• [messaging] Matrix.org: Decentralized group chat   Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] Matrix.org: Decentralized group chat   Ben Laurie
• [messaging] Matrix.org: Decentralized group chat   Mike Hearn
• [messaging] Matrix.org: Decentralized group chat   Ben Laurie
• [messaging] Matrix.org: Decentralized group chat   Mike Hearn
• [messaging] Matrix.org: Decentralized group chat   Ximin Luo
• [messaging] Matrix.org: Decentralized group chat   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Matrix.org: Decentralized group chat   Joseph Gentle
• [messaging] Matrix.org: Decentralized group chat   Ximin Luo
• [messaging] Matrix.org: Decentralized group chat   Ximin Luo
• [messaging] Matrix.org: Decentralized group chat   Natanael
• [messaging] Matrix.org: Decentralized group chat   Ximin Luo
• [messaging] Matrix.org: Decentralized group chat   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Matrix.org: Decentralized group chat   Natanael
• [messaging] Matrix.org: Decentralized group chat   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Matrix.org: Decentralized group chat   Ximin Luo
• [messaging] Matrix.org: Decentralized group chat   Ximin Luo
• [messaging] Matrix.org: Decentralized group chat   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Matrix.org: Decentralized group chat   Matthew Hodgson
• [messaging] Matrix.org: Decentralized group chat   Ximin Luo
• [messaging] Matrix.org: Decentralized group chat   Ximin Luo
• [messaging] Matrix.org: Decentralized group chat   Matthew Hodgson
• [messaging] Matrix.org: Decentralized group chat   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Matrix.org: Decentralized group chat   Matthew Hodgson
• [messaging] Matrix.org: Decentralized group chat   Ximin Luo
• [messaging] Matrix.org: Decentralized group chat   Erik Johnston
• [messaging] Matrix.org: Decentralized group chat   Ximin Luo
• [messaging] Matrix.org: Decentralized group chat   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Merging in partially-ordered private group chats; was: Re: Matrix.org: Decentralized group chat   Ximin Luo
• [messaging] Merging in partially-ordered private group chats; was: Re: Matrix.org: Decentralized group chat   Ximin Luo
• [messaging] Merging in partially-ordered private group chats; was: Re: Matrix.org: Decentralized group chat   Nadim Kobeissi
• [messaging] Message persistence   steve at actor.im
• [messaging] Message persistence   Natanael
• [messaging] Message persistence   steve at actor.im
• [messaging] Message persistence   Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] Message persistence   steve at actor.im
• [messaging] Message persistence   David Gil
• [messaging] Message persistence   steve at actor.im
• [messaging] Message persistence   David Gil
• [messaging] Message persistence   carlo von lynX
• [messaging] Message persistence   Natanael
• [messaging] Message persistence   carlo von lynX
• [messaging] Message persistence   Daniel Kahn Gillmor
• [messaging] Messaging Digest, Vol 357, Issue 1   Martin Dehnel-Wild
• [messaging] Messaging Digest, Vol 357, Issue 1   Martin Dehnel-Wild
• [messaging] Messaging Digest, Vol 357, Issue 1   U.Mutlu
• [messaging] MITM-safe communication w/o authentication possible?   U.Mutlu
• [messaging] MITM-safe communication w/o authentication possible?   Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] MITM-safe communication w/o authentication possible?   Adam Langley
• [messaging] MITM-safe communication w/o authentication possible?   Natanael
• [messaging] MITM-safe communication w/o authentication possible?   U.Mutlu
• [messaging] MITM-safe communication w/o authentication possible?   Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] MITM-safe communication w/o authentication possible?   Joseph Bonneau
• [messaging] MITM-safe communication w/o authentication possible?   Ximin Luo
• [messaging] MITM-safe communication w/o authentication possible?   U.Mutlu
• [messaging] MITM-safe communication w/o authentication possible?   Natanael
• [messaging] MITM-safe communication w/o authentication possible?   Ethan Heilman
• [messaging] MITM-safe communication w/o authentication possible?   Ximin Luo
• [messaging] MITM-safe communication w/o authentication possible?   Ethan Heilman
• [messaging] MITM-safe communication w/o authentication possible?   Natanael
• [messaging] MITM-safe communication w/o authentication possible?   Ximin Luo
• [messaging] MITM-safe communication w/o authentication possible?   Ethan Heilman
• [messaging] MITM-safe communication w/o authentication possible?   Ethan Heilman
• [messaging] MITM-safe communication w/o authentication possible?   Andy Isaacson
• [messaging] MITM-safe communication w/o authentication possible?   Max Krohn
• [messaging] MITM-safe communication w/o authentication possible?   Karl
• [messaging] MITM-safe communication w/o authentication possible?   David Lazar
• [messaging] MITM-safe communication w/o authentication possible?   Ximin Luo
• [messaging] MITM-safe communication w/o authentication possible?   Ximin Luo
• [messaging] MITM-safe communication w/o authentication possible?   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] MITM-safe communication w/o authentication possible?   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] MITM-safe communication w/o authentication possible?   Karl
• [messaging] MITM-safe communication w/o authentication possible?   Daniel Kahn Gillmor
• [messaging] MITM-safe communication w/o authentication possible?   Michael Rogers
• [messaging] MITM-safe communication w/o authentication possible?   Karl
• [messaging] MITM-safe communication w/o authentication possible?   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] MPHFs for public key lookup?   Jason A. Donenfeld
• [messaging] MPHFs for public key lookup?   Jason A. Donenfeld
• [messaging] MPHFs for public key lookup?   Daniel Kahn Gillmor
• [messaging] MPHFs for public key lookup?   nymble at gmail.com
• [messaging] MPHFs for public key lookup?   Brian Warner
• [messaging] MPHFs for public key lookup?   Michael Rogers
• [messaging] MSc thesis on group messaging and group key exchange protocols   George Kadianakis
• [messaging] Multiple devices and key synchronization: some thoughts   Michael Rogers
• [messaging] Multiple devices and key synchronization: some thoughts   carlo von lynX
• [messaging] Multiple devices and key synchronization: some thoughts   Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] Multiple devices and key synchronization: some thoughts   carlo von lynX
• [messaging] Multiple devices and key synchronization: some thoughts   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Multiple devices and key synchronization: some thoughts   str4d
• [messaging] Multiple devices and key synchronization: some thoughts   Michael Rogers
• [messaging] Multiple devices and key synchronization: some thoughts   Ben Harris
• [messaging] Multiple devices and key synchronization: some thoughts   Joseph Bonneau
• [messaging] Multiple devices and key synchronization: some thoughts   Sam Lanning
• [messaging] Multiple devices and key synchronization: some thoughts   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Multiple devices and key synchronization: some thoughts   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Multiple devices and key synchronization: some thoughts   Sam Lanning
• [messaging] Multiple devices and key synchronization: some thoughts   David Gil
• [messaging] Multiple devices and key synchronization: some thoughts   David Gil
• [messaging] Multiple devices and key synchronization: some thoughts   Joseph Bonneau
• [messaging] Multiple devices and key synchronization: some thoughts   David Gil
• [messaging] Multiple devices and key synchronization: some thoughts   Sam Lanning
• [messaging] Multiple devices and key synchronization: some thoughts   Michael Rogers
• [messaging] Multiple devices and key synchronization: some thoughts   carlo von lynX
• [messaging] Multiple devices and key synchronization: some thoughts   Michael Rogers
• [messaging] Multiple devices and key synchronization: some thoughts   carlo von lynX
• [messaging] Multiple devices and key synchronization: some thoughts   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Multiple devices and key synchronization: some thoughts   Michael Rogers
• [messaging] Multiple devices and key synchronization: some thoughts   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Multiple devices and key synchronization: some thoughts   Michael Rogers
• [messaging] Multiple devices and key synchronization: some thoughts   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Multiple devices and key synchronization: some thoughts   Michael Rogers
• [messaging] Multiple devices and key synchronization: some thoughts   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Namecoin, squatting and decentralized solutions to Zooko's triangle   Joseph Bonneau
• [messaging] Namecoin, squatting and decentralized solutions to Zooko's triangle   Mike Hearn
• [messaging] Namecoin, squatting and decentralized solutions to Zooko's triangle   Natanael
• [messaging] Naming and classifying a security property   Ximin Luo
• [messaging] Naming and classifying a security property   Ximin Luo
• [messaging] Naming and classifying a security property   Katriel Cohn-Gordon
• [messaging] Naming and classifying a security property   Ximin Luo
• [messaging] Naming and classifying a security property   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Naming and classifying a security property   Ximin Luo
• [messaging] Naming and classifying a security property   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Naming and classifying a security property   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Naming and classifying a security property   Ximin Luo
• [messaging] OnionPhone - VOIP over Tor   Van Gegel
• [messaging] Online update and dev platforms for crypto apps   Mike Hearn
• [messaging] Online update and dev platforms for crypto apps   Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] Online update and dev platforms for crypto apps   zaki at manian.org
• [messaging] Online update and dev platforms for crypto apps   Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] Online update and dev platforms for crypto apps   Tom Ritter
• [messaging] Online update and dev platforms for crypto apps   Mike Hearn
• [messaging] PAKE introduction   Alexandre Anzala-Yamajako
• [messaging] PAKE introduction   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Passphrase-based key mobility (was: Peerio)   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Passphrase-based key mobility (was: Peerio)   Michael Hamburg
• [messaging] Passphrase-based key mobility (was: Peerio)   Nadim Kobeissi
• [messaging] Passphrase-based key mobility (was: Peerio)   Natanael
• [messaging] Passphrase-based key mobility (was: Peerio)   Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] Passphrase-based key mobility (was: Peerio)   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Passphrase-based key mobility (was: Peerio)   Nadim Kobeissi
• [messaging] Passphrase-based key mobility (was: Peerio)   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Passphrase-based key mobility (was: Peerio)   Nadim Kobeissi
• [messaging] Passphrase-based key mobility (was: Peerio)   Tao Effect
• [messaging] Passphrase-based key mobility (was: Peerio)   Steve Weis
• [messaging] Passphrase-based key mobility (was: Peerio)   Garrett Robinson
• [messaging] Passphrase-based key mobility (was: Peerio)   Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] Passphrase-based key mobility (was: Peerio)   Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] Passphrase-based key mobility (was: Peerio)   Ben Laurie
• [messaging] Passphrase-based key mobility (was: Peerio)   Ben Laurie
• [messaging] Passphrase-based key mobility (was: Peerio)   Ben Harris
• [messaging] Passphrase-based key mobility (was: Peerio)   Nadim Kobeissi
• [messaging] Passphrase-based key mobility (was: Peerio)   Mike Hearn
• [messaging] Peerio   Mike Hearn
• [messaging] Peerio   zaki at manian.org
• [messaging] Peerio   Tao Effect
• [messaging] Peerio   Mike Hearn
• [messaging] Peerio   zaki at manian.org
• [messaging] Peerio   Andrew Hintz
• [messaging] Peerio   Ben Laurie
• [messaging] Peerio   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Peerio   Joseph Bonneau
• [messaging] Peerio   Justin Tracey
• [messaging] Peerio   Watson Ladd
• [messaging] Peerio   Joseph Bonneau
• [messaging] Peerio   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Peerio   Jonathan Moore
• [messaging] Peerio   Mike Hearn
• [messaging] Peerio   Daniel Kahn Gillmor
• [messaging] Peerio   Nadim Kobeissi
• [messaging] Peerio   zaki at manian.org
• [messaging] Peerio   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Peerio   Nadim Kobeissi
• [messaging] Peerio   Daniel Kahn Gillmor
• [messaging] Peerio   Nadim Kobeissi
• [messaging] Peerio   Mike Hearn
• [messaging] Peerio   Daniel Kahn Gillmor
• [messaging] Peerio   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Peerio   Nadim Kobeissi
• [messaging] Peerio   Jonathan Rudenberg
• [messaging] Peerio   Ben Harris
• [messaging] Peerio   Jonathan Rudenberg
• [messaging] Peerio   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Peerio   Nadim Kobeissi
• [messaging] Peerio   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Peerio   Maxwell Krohn
• [messaging] Peerio   Daniel Kahn Gillmor
• [messaging] Peerio   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Peerio   Michael Hamburg
• [messaging] Peerio   Joseph Bonneau
• [messaging] Peerio   Nadim Kobeissi
• [messaging] Peerio   Ben Laurie
• [messaging] Peerio   Ben Harris
• [messaging] Peerio   Ben Laurie
• [messaging] Peerio   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Peerio   Ben Harris
• [messaging] Peerio   Ben Laurie
• [messaging] PKI is dead   U.Mutlu
• [messaging] PKI is dead   Justin King-Lacroix
• [messaging] PKI is dead   Michael Hamburg
• [messaging] PKI is dead   Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] PKI is dead   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] PKI is dead   Tao Effect
• [messaging] PKI is dead   U.Mutlu
• [messaging] PKI is dead   U.Mutlu
• [messaging] PKI is dead   Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] PKI is dead   Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] PKI is dead   U.Mutlu
• [messaging] PKI is dead   U.Mutlu
• [messaging] PKI is dead   Tao Effect
• [messaging] PKI is dead   Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] PKI is dead   U.Mutlu
• [messaging] PKI is dead   U.Mutlu
• [messaging] PKI is dead   U.Mutlu
• [messaging] PKI is dead   Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] PKI is dead   U.Mutlu
• [messaging] PKI is dead   Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] PKI is dead   U.Mutlu
• [messaging] PKI is dead   Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] PKI is dead   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] PKI is dead   U.Mutlu
• [messaging] PKI is dead   carlo von lynX
• [messaging] Pond-like tokens for email (was: TOFU to ease PGP key discovery)   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Pond-like tokens for email (was: TOFU to ease PGP key discovery)   Ben Harris
• [messaging] Pond-like tokens for email (was: TOFU to ease PGP key discovery)   elijah
• [messaging] pond alike group messaging   azul
• [messaging] pond alike group messaging   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] pond alike group messaging   Mike Hearn
• [messaging] pond alike lists (was: pond alike group messaging)   azul
• [messaging] pond alike lists (was: pond alike group messaging)   Mike Hearn
• [messaging] pond alike lists (was: pond alike group messaging)   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] pond alike lists (was: Re: pond alike group messaging)   azul
• [messaging] pond alike lists (was: Re: pond alike group messaging)   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] pond alike lists (was: Re: pond alike group messaging)   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] pond alike lists (was: Re: pond alike group messaging)   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Post-quantum forward-secrecy   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Post-quantum forward-secrecy   Adam Langley
• [messaging] Post-quantum forward-secrecy   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Post-quantum forward-secrecy   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Post-quantum forward-secrecy   Martin Albrecht
• [messaging] Post-quantum forward-secrecy   Daniel Kahn Gillmor
• [messaging] Pour one out for "voice authentication"   Joseph Bonneau
• [messaging] Pour one out for "voice authentication"   Mike Hearn
• [messaging] Pour one out for "voice authentication"   Joseph Bonneau
• [messaging] Pour one out for "voice authentication"   Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] Pour one out for "voice authentication"   Daniel Kahn Gillmor
• [messaging] Pour one out for "voice authentication"   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Pour one out for "voice authentication"   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Pour one out for "voice authentication"   Joseph Bonneau
• [messaging] Pour one out for "voice authentication"   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Pour one out for "voice authentication"   Alfonso De Gregorio
• [messaging] Pour one out for "voice authentication"   Michael Hamburg
• [messaging] Pour one out for "voice authentication"   Joseph Bonneau
• [messaging] Pour one out for "voice authentication"   Van Gegel
• [messaging] PPTP Security   Eren Türkay
• [messaging] Prekey reuse   N A
• [messaging] Presence by DP5-PIR, GNS or multicast?   carlo von lynX
• [messaging] Privacy Lab @ Mozilla - April 23rd   Noah Swartz
• [messaging] Privacy Tool Meet-up in San Francisco - 1/28   Noah Swartz
• [messaging] Privacy Tool Meet-up in San Francisco - 1/28   steve at actor.im
• [messaging] Privacy Tools Meet-up - Feb 25th @ SF Nonprofit Tech Center   Noah Swartz
• [messaging] Privacy Tools Meet-up - Feb 25th @ SF Nonprofit Tech Center   Tom Lowenthal
• [messaging] Proof of Transition: a new thin client technique for blockchains   Tao Effect
• [messaging] Proof of Transition to keep DNSChain servers honest   Tao Effect
• [messaging] Proof of Transition to keep DNSChain servers honest   Tao Effect
• [messaging] Provable Anonymity: Dining cryptographers, DC-nets, and Dissent   Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] Provable Anonymity: Dining cryptographers, DC-nets, and Dissent   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Recognizing senders of metadata-hidden messages   Brian Warner
• [messaging] Recognizing senders of metadata-hidden messages   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Recognizing senders of metadata-hidden messages   Brian Warner
• [messaging] Recognizing senders of metadata-hidden messages   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Recognizing senders of metadata-hidden messages   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Recognizing senders of metadata-hidden messages   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Recognizing senders of metadata-hidden messages   Ben Harris
• [messaging] Recognizing senders of metadata-hidden messages   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Recognizing senders of metadata-hidden messages   Brian Warner
• [messaging] Recognizing senders of metadata-hidden messages   Ben Harris
• [messaging] Recognizing senders of metadata-hidden messages (was: MPHFs for public key lookup?)   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Recognizing senders of metadata-hidden messages (was: MPHFs for public key lookup?)   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Reduce identity key exposure in Pond   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Reduce identity key exposure in Pond   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Reduce identity key exposure in Pond   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Reduce identity key exposure in Pond   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Reduce identity key exposure in Pond   Ben Harris
• [messaging] Reduce identity key exposure in Pond   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Reduce identity key exposure in Pond   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Reduce identity key exposure in Pond   Joseph Bonneau
• [messaging] Reduce identity key exposure in Pond   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Reliable Security Estimates for Key Stretching   Nadim Kobeissi
• [messaging] Reliable Security Estimates for Key Stretching   Daniel Kahn Gillmor
• [messaging] Reliable Security Estimates for Key Stretching   Taylor R Campbell
• [messaging] Reliable Security Estimates for Key Stretching   Joseph Bonneau
• [messaging] replay protection in asynchronous mixnets with high throughput   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] replay protection in asynchronous mixnets with high throughput   str4d
• [messaging] replay protection in asynchronous mixnets with high throughput   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] replay protection in asynchronous mixnets with high throughput   str4d
• [messaging] replay protection is asynchronous mixnets with high throughput   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] RFC: async NaCl relay   Max Skibinsky
• [messaging] RFC: async NaCl relay   U.Mutlu
• [messaging] RFC: async NaCl relay   Max Skibinsky
• [messaging] RFC: async NaCl relay   U.Mutlu
• [messaging] RFC: async NaCl relay   Max Skibinsky
• [messaging] RFC: async NaCl relay   Ben Harris
• [messaging] RFC: async NaCl relay   Max Skibinsky
• [messaging] RFC: async NaCl relay   Ben Harris
• [messaging] RFC: async NaCl relay   Ben Harris
• [messaging] RFC: async NaCl relay   Max Skibinsky
• [messaging] RFC: async NaCl relay   Ben Harris
• [messaging] RFC: async NaCl relay   Max Skibinsky
• [messaging] S/MIME in corporate settings (was Re: TOFU to ease PGP key discovery)   Andy Isaacson
• [messaging] S/MIME in corporate settings (was Re: TOFU to ease PGP key discovery)   Mike Hearn
• [messaging] secret handshakes (was: Recognizing senders of metadata-hidden messages)   Brian Warner
• [messaging] Secure OpenPGP Key Pair Synchronization via IMAP (RFC)   Tankred Hase
• [messaging] Secure OpenPGP Key Pair Synchronization via IMAP (RFC)   David Leon Gil
• [messaging] Secure OpenPGP Key Pair Synchronization via IMAP (RFC)   Tankred Hase
• [messaging] Secure OpenPGP Key Pair Synchronization via IMAP (RFC)   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Secure OpenPGP Key Pair Synchronization via IMAP (RFC)   Tankred Hase
• [messaging] Secure OpenPGP Key Pair Synchronization via IMAP (RFC)   Daniel Roesler
• [messaging] Secure OpenPGP Key Pair Synchronization via IMAP (RFC)   Tankred Hase
• [messaging] Secure OpenPGP Key Pair Synchronization via IMAP (RFC)   Michael Rogers
• [messaging] Secure OpenPGP Key Pair Synchronization via IMAP (RFC)   Vincent Breitmoser
• [messaging] Secure OpenPGP Key Pair Synchronization via IMAP (RFC)   Daniel Kahn Gillmor
• [messaging] Secure OpenPGP Key Pair Synchronization via IMAP (RFC)   Tankred Hase
• [messaging] Secure OpenPGP Key Pair Synchronization via IMAP (RFC)   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Secure OpenPGP Key Pair Synchronization via IMAP (RFC)   David Leon Gil
• [messaging] Secure OpenPGP Key Pair Synchronization via IMAP (RFC)   Tom Ritter
• [messaging] Secure OpenPGP Key Pair Synchronization via IMAP (RFC)   Tankred Hase
• [messaging] Security arguments for read receipts   Ximin Luo
• [messaging] Security arguments for read receipts   Natanael
• [messaging] Security arguments for read receipts   Ximin Luo
• [messaging] Security arguments for read receipts   Natanael
• [messaging] Security arguments for read receipts   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Security arguments for read receipts   Ximin Luo
• [messaging] Security arguments for read receipts   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Security arguments for read receipts   Natanael
• [messaging] Security arguments for read receipts   Ximin Luo
• [messaging] Security arguments for read receipts   Ximin Luo
• [messaging] Security arguments for read receipts   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] ShadowCrypt   Wasa Bee
• [messaging] Short Authentication String usability study   Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] SimplySecure offering UX and design help for encrypted messaging apps   Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] Slide attack to lightweight algorithms   Erkan Uslu
• [messaging] Sphinx symmetric crypto questions   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Sphinx symmetric crypto questions   Ian Goldberg
• [messaging] Sphinx symmetric crypto questions   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Sphinx symmetric crypto questions   Ian Goldberg
• [messaging] Sphinx symmetric crypto questions   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Sphinx symmetric crypto questions   Natanael
• [messaging] Strong encryption ONLINE to test ( any file: wave, image, text, pdf, excutable, etc )   Carlos França
• [messaging] Strong encryption ONLINE to test ( any file: wave, image, text, pdf, excutable, etc )   Steve Weis
• [messaging] symmetric cyphers with independent key material   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] symmetric cyphers with independent key material   Natanael
• [messaging] symmetric cyphers with independent key material   Ben Harris
• [messaging] symmetric cyphers with independent key material   Tom Ritter
• [messaging] Testing skillshare at Circumvention Tech Fest   Gillian "Gus" Andrews
• [messaging] TOFU Support in GNUPG   Frederic Jacobs
• [messaging] TOFU Support in GNUPG   Ximin Luo
• [messaging] TOFU Support in GNUPG   Sam Lanning
• [messaging] TOFU Support in GNUPG   Sam Lanning
• [messaging] TOFU to ease PGP key discovery   Tankred Hase
• [messaging] TOFU to ease PGP key discovery   Michael Rogers
• [messaging] TOFU to ease PGP key discovery   Ben Harris
• [messaging] TOFU to ease PGP key discovery   Tankred Hase
• [messaging] TOFU to ease PGP key discovery   Mike Hearn
• [messaging] TOFU to ease PGP key discovery   Tankred Hase
• [messaging] TOFU to ease PGP key discovery   Daniel Kahn Gillmor
• [messaging] TOFU to ease PGP key discovery   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] TOFU to ease PGP key discovery   Joseph Bonneau
• [messaging] TOFU to ease PGP key discovery   Daniel Roesler
• [messaging] TOFU to ease PGP key discovery   Mike Hearn
• [messaging] TOFU to ease PGP key discovery   Mike Hearn
• [messaging] TOFU to ease PGP key discovery   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] TOFU to ease PGP key discovery   Bjarni Runar Einarsson
• [messaging] TOFU to ease PGP key discovery   elijah
• [messaging] TOFU to ease PGP key discovery   Tankred Hase
• [messaging] TOFU to ease PGP key discovery   Mike Hearn
• [messaging] TOFU to ease PGP key discovery   Tankred Hase
• [messaging] TOFU to ease PGP key discovery   Daniel Roesler
• [messaging] TOFU to ease PGP key discovery   Tankred Hase
• [messaging] TOFU to ease PGP key discovery   Daniel Roesler
• [messaging] TOFU to ease PGP key discovery   Ruben Pollan
• [messaging] TOFU to ease PGP key discovery   elijah
• [messaging] TOFU to ease PGP key discovery   Mike Hearn
• [messaging] TOFU to ease PGP key discovery   elijah
• [messaging] Using Elasticsearch on the SKS/GPG keyserver pool   Daniel Roesler
• [messaging] Using Elasticsearch on the SKS/GPG keyserver pool   David Leon Gil
• [messaging] Using Elasticsearch on the SKS/GPG keyserver pool   zaki at manian.org
• [messaging] Value of deniability   Natanael
• [messaging] Verified key transitions (was: TOFU to ease PGP key discovery)   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Verified key transitions (was: TOFU to ease PGP key discovery)   Natanael
• [messaging] Verified key transitions (was: TOFU to ease PGP key discovery)   Joseph Bonneau
• [messaging] Verified key transitions (was: TOFU to ease PGP key discovery)   elijah
• [messaging] Verified key transitions (was: TOFU to ease PGP key discovery)   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Vuvuzela: Scalable Private Messaging Resistant to Traffic Analysis   carlo walentiny
• [messaging] Vuvuzela: Scalable Private Messaging Resistant to Traffic Analysis   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Vuvuzela: Scalable Private Messaging Resistant to Traffic Analysis   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Vuvuzela: Scalable Private Messaging Resistant to Traffic Analysis   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Vuvuzela: Scalable Private Messaging Resistant to Traffic Analysis   Trevor Perrin
• [messaging] Vuvuzela: Scalable Private Messaging Resistant to Traffic Analysis   David Lazar
• [messaging] Vuvuzela source code   David Lazar
• [messaging] What counts as proof of ownership?   Daniel Roesler
• [messaging] What counts as proof of ownership?   Tao Effect
• [messaging] What counts as proof of ownership?   Daniel Roesler
• [messaging] what is the role of wrap-resistance in onion routing?   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] what is the role of wrap-resistance in onion routing?   Natanael
• [messaging] what is the role of wrap-resistance in onion routing?   Jeff Burdges
• [messaging] Wickr Protocol Description   Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] Wickr Protocol Description   steve at actor.im
• [messaging] Wickr Protocol Description   Matt Corallo
• [messaging] Wickr Protocol Description   Matt Corallo
• [messaging] Wickr Protocol Description   Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] Wickr Protocol Description   Matt Corallo
• [messaging] Wickr Protocol Description   Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] Wickr Protocol Description   Matt Corallo
• [messaging] Wickr Protocol Description   Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] Yet another secure messaging app   Tim Bray
• [messaging] Yet another secure messaging app   Tony Arcieri
• [messaging] Yet another secure messaging app   Joseph Bonneau
• [messaging] Yet another secure messaging app   Tony Arcieri

Last message date: Tue Dec 22 23:31:41 PST 2015
Archived on: Tue Dec 22 23:32:02 PST 2015

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